

A

L E T T E R

T O

EDMUND BURKE, Esq.

Occasioned by his

SPEECH IN PARLIAMENT

February 11, 1780.

*— tibi cura magni  
Cæsar is fatis data : tu, secundo  
Cæsare, regnes.*

HOR.

L O N D O N :

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L E T T E R

T O

EDMUND BURKE, Esq.

S I R,

**T**O correct the disorders of a great and ancient state; disorders which have *grown with its growth, and strengthened with its strength,* is so nice and so difficult an undertaking, that we ought not to wonder if those who try it should fail in the attempt. But the undertaking is of so noble and so beneficent a kind, that even the attempt, when sincere and disinterested, merits some share of our approbation. There are, indeed, many people who will not grant this species of merit to you and your associates,  
in

in your present scheme of reforming the government of Great Britain : alledging that your motives are sordid or spiteful, and your purposes mischievous. Upon what they found this allegation I do not know, for I cannot allow that a mischievous conduct is a sufficient proof of a mischievous intention. But let them found it upon what they will, no such conjecture will appear in any part of this letter. On the contrary, it will every where presume, that your purpose is to promote the public welfare, and will only enquire how far the wisdom of the means has been adequate to the benignity of the end.

Those who do not look deeper than the surface of things, may perhaps consider this letter as a criticism upon your conduct ; but without a more extended view, I should not have written a single line of it. It is indeed addressed to you ; but not as a private gentleman, or as a member for the city of Bristol : it is addressed to you as the mouth of a formidable party,

as the representative of all the county meetings, committees, and other reforming associations now swarming in every part of the kingdom: and, as it is things, not persons, which are the objects of my enquiry, I shall make no scruple in blending your conduct and theirs into one mass, or in mixing my observations upon what is contained in their petitions with what I find in your speech, without being at the pains of nicely distinguishing them.

I shall, then, set out with this general observation; that in all your proceedings, though intimately connected with the supreme political affairs of this country, there is nothing that announces that *spirit of business* which distinguishes great statesmen from great men of every other profession. Not to indulge myself in the use of ambiguous phrases, I mean by the *spirit of business*, that species of mind which is constantly occupied in the consideration of cause and effect; which looks back with ease to the *pourquoi* of the *pourquoi*, and forward

forward to the consequence of consequences ; and which forbids the engaging in any enterprize till all the steps are foreseen, and all the means are provided for rendering it effectual.

To enter at once upon the subject : Your first general positions are, that an *undue* expenditure of the public money ought to be prevented ; that *exorbitant* salaries ought to be diminished ; that *unmerited* pensions ought to be rescinded ; and, that *abuses* in government ought to be reformed : positions so ridiculously true, that nothing can account for their coming from the mouth of any man of the least discernment, except their being meant as baits for drawing shallow people to put their names to petitions containing a variety of other matters of a much more dark and ambiguous kind.

To make us however amends for this too great simplicity, the next set of positions, and which make the most shining figure in all your speeches and petitions, are so

far

far from being truisms, that they are not true at all; I mean the assertions that this extravagant distribution of the public money in salaries and pensions is instrumental to the influence of the Crown; that the increase of it tends to increase this influence; and that this influence is dangerous to the liberty of the people.

Men who reason without facts, or, what is worse, from facts ill understood and improperly stated, must never expect a rational or useful conclusion. Let us, then, examine strictly what is the true state of the facts, relatively to this matter. Influence in government can only originate from power or riches; words in the political dictionary meaning almost the same thing. Whatever original power or riches the Kings of England might have formerly possessed, I leave to the discussion of historians and antiquaries; it is to us a matter of mere curiosity, and totally unconnected with the present question. Notwithstanding the high sounding words of King, Lords, and Commons in parlia-

ment assembled, it is a fact of great notoriety, and of which no man of reflection can be ignorant, that the disposal of the riches, and with it the supreme uncontrollable power of this country, has been for many years exercised by the majority of the House of Commons alone; and that any attempt in the other two parts of the legislature to interfere in this important money business, has been held to be unconstitutional.

This is a system which has been gradually forming upon what are now called Revolution Principles. It has been styled by its friends *The Whig System*; and by its enemies, *The System of Corruption*; but I, who neither mean to praise or to blame, and only mean, without fee or reward, to shew, what it really is, do say, that it is the popular or democratic system, and the most popular and democratic that was ever seen in any empire so rich and extended as ours. It is a system originating from the people, and which has been carried to the utmost limits of popularity

that are consistent with civil order and government : nay I even suspect, with some degree of uneasiness, that it has already passed those limits, and that the disorders which have always accompanied every attempt of the many to govern the many, already begin to shew themselves.

This my assertion, that there is now no original power in the Crown, and that all the power it *seems* to exercise is merely a delegated one from the majority of the House of Commons, in whom all is vested by the People, is founded, as I said, upon facts well known to all who have made those subjects their study ; but as the actual conduct of state affairs is now extended to thousands who have little means or leisure to acquire any knowledge of them beyond what the news-papers afford, I will here, for their benefit, enumerate some of the principal facts alluded to.

The King is vulgarly said to have the power of declaring war, and of making peace—to have the command of all the

military force of the nation—to have the appointment of all the officers of the army and navy—to have the appointment of the officers of his own household, and of every department, civil as well as military ; and that any residue of the public money not so employed, he has the right of disposing of, in the way of pensions, to whoever pleases him.

These, Sir, as they stand upon my paper, are truly royal powers ; they are the powers by which all Kings have governed ; and greater than those no King, the most despotic, was ever vested with. But let us take care not to mistake shadows for substances. It will be found upon a closer inspection that these powers are only lent, and, like most other loans, for the benefit of the lenders ; who have it always in their power to with-hold or withdraw the loan in case the conditions upon which it is lent are not complied with. When once it is acknowledged that the King has little or no private property of his own, and that the majority of the House of Commons

mons have the exclusive privilege of *giving and granting* the nation's money for every purpose, civil and military, all the consequences I have hinted are obvious. The King, I have said, may declare war; but if the majority of the House of Commons are not willing to vote the requisite supplies, his declaration must be immediately recalled; to prevent which he will be sure not to declare any war till this majority have made it their own, by testifying their approbation of it. He, it is said, has the command of the army and navy; but if the House of Commons do not chuse to vote the annual money for their pay, he would have no army or navy to command: and in case they should postpone the passing the annual act of parliament against mutiny and desertion till after the 25th of *March*, the army on foot, down to the sentinel at his palace-gate, would be legally disbanded.

With regard to the disposal of offices, civil and military, it is needless to enter into a tedious detail. It is easy for a man  
of

of your good memory and readiness of speech to make a commentary upon the little red book to last three hours and a half ; but when done, we shall learn little more from it than from the short anecdote you relate from Lord TALBOT, who, you say, gave up all his attempts to reform the King's kitchen, upon finding that the Turnspit was a Member of parliament. This is enough for our instruction, *et hoc nobis non altius inferet Ammon.* Why fatigue ourselves with hacking at the wide-spreading and ever-renewing branches of a noxious tree, when the single root lies so visible, and so exposed to the axe ?

But, Sir, I will go further, and will assert, that *a real man of business* did not stand in need of this information from Lord TALBOT in order to be let into the secret. A general knowledge of mankind, and a general knowledge of the real constitution of this country, ought to have been sufficient for the purpose. All men, in all countries, and in all times, who have been possessed of supreme power,

have

have constantly availed themselves of that advantage for enriching themselves and their connections. The majority of the House of Commons, our present supreme power, is composed of men; and it would be an excess of folly to suppose them actuated by motives different from the rest of mankind. In fact, there is not a single place of those said to be in the *gift* of the Crown, that is not possessed by a Member of parliament, or by somebody who holds it at his requisition. These requisitions are made, sometimes in polite terms, sometimes roughly; but in whatever form they are urged, they must be complied with, *else*—Do you ask me what is further meant by the word *else*? The answer is exceedingly obvious; the person commonly called the Chief Minister, but who is, in reality, no more than the agent for transacting what belongs to this political loan between the Crown and the People, would soon, in case of repeated refusals, have a majority of the House of Commons against him, who,

who, by an address to his majesty, would immediately get him removed from his office; as they would, in like manner, his successor, if he shewed himself equally ignorant in distinguishing who were his real masters. I am almost ashamed to have written so much in explanation of a matter of so simple a kind as to require but a hint to be perfectly understood. I will, therefore, conclude this part of my subject by observing, that when you, by your new Act of parliament, shall have stripped the King of the small remains of his private fortune, the private fortune of his ancestors from William the Conqueror, that he will be the only man in the British dominions who has neither liberty nor property to boast of; and that he will be intirely at the mercy of the majority of the House of Commons for the shoes he wears, and for the bread he daily distributes to his numerous and beautiful family. To this you will perhaps say, that he has no need of private property, for that *the parish is bound to find*

find him. Be it so : I know it has been long a favourite notion of a certain set of people ; and I do not desire them to adopt any notion of mine in the room of it. All I desire of them, and of you, is, a little meaning and consistency ; and that you would desist from inflaming the minds of the populace by declamations about the *dangerous influence* of a person whom the popular system has already reduced to the most helpless state of dependence.

Once more let me repeat, that I neither mean to praise or to blame our present system of government : I mean to act a part somewhat similar to that of a post upon the highway, which points out the several roads to the doubtful traveller, while it has, itself, no intention of stirring a foot.

In the exercise, then, of this post-like function, allow me to point out to you, that the present influence, either as it is represented by you, or by me, can, in such

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neither case, be dangerous to the liberty of the people. It is, indeed, a system that by over-checking the public exertions, may, some time or other, endanger the independency of the whole British State, relatively to foreigners, and with it all our lives, liberties, and properties ; but the internal liberty of the people, relatively to their own rulers, can never be affected by any increase of it ; except that increase should go so far as to produce anarchy, or a total dissolution of that very corrupt system ~~the~~ you complain of : In the mean while the people themselves are the *primum mobile* of this system, the primary disposers of their own liberty, or political power.

— *sectorque favoris*

*Ipse sui populus* —

and whether this favour of the people is to be acquired by love or by money, is nothing to the present question. They will always be their own masters while they continue to have the disposal of themselves ; and will be the more tenacious

cious in retaining and extending their liberty, the higher price they find it will bring. This increasing influence, for I am sensible that it does increase, is owing to the increasing avidity of Members of parliament, partly occasioned by the increasing number and avidity of their constituents: and it will probably continue increasing till such time as all the money that can be raised from the *whole* of the inhabitants of Great Britain, assisted by all the money his Majesty may draw from his more distant dominions, will be unable to satisfy them. Beyond this period I do not chuse to cast my eye; but, as a friend to liberty, hope it is still at a great distance.

That there may be errors and extravagancies in the expenditure of the public money, is what I do not attempt to controvert; and heartily wish, with you, that they could be altogether prevented. The question still to be answered, is, how? Many attempts have been made of this sort, but being rather the product of fa-

tion and clamour than of any solid principle, have been found to do more harm than good. Place-acts, after place-acts, have been passed, to prevent persons holding offices from sitting in the House of Commons; by which that House has been deprived of many men whose general knowledge of business would have been a help, and whose celebrity of character would have been an ornament to it; while their seats in the house have been filled by remitters, contractors, and others of the same obscure and illiberal class, and whose emoluments are much more difficult to be limited or ascertained. These, Sir, are things not to be rashly and inconsiderately tampered with. If the evils we complain of are without remedy, the complaint is weak and unmanly: if there is a visible remedy, but which, upon application, would produce a worse distemper, it would be madness to apply it. In no part of your Speech do I find this important point of the remedy taken into consideration; and this is what I call a

want

want of that *spirit of business*, which, in my opinion, is not to be compensated by the most lively metaphors, or the most harmonious periods. The first step to be taken towards the cure of any distemper is to find out the true cause. The cause being removed, the distemper will probably cease of itself. If the cause is of such a nature as not to be susceptible of removal, the case is desperate. You have assigned as the cause of our exorbitant expences the overbearing and growing influence of the Crown, and in consequence of this notion have advised parliament to strip the King of the small remains of his patrimonial revenue, in order to render him, if possible, more dependent upon the House of Commons. But unless all I have said of the power of the House of Common, is a chain of falsehoods, the cause you assign is the reverse of the true one; and consequently every new step taken to increase the power of the Commons and the dependence of the Crown, must operate in increasing the evil.

But

But these are not the only things in which the *spirit of business* is wanting. Whether the public money goes into the pockets of the majority in parliament by the voluntary contrivance of the King, or by their own sovereign will and pleasure, still it is allowed to go into their pockets. What hope, then, is there of any redress from petitions or speeches that are addressed to the persons acknowledged to be in fault? To constitute those who are parties to be likewise the judges in the cause, shews very little of the *spirit of business*, and very little knowledge of the means by which all business is rendered effectual. Perhaps you may say, you mean no more than to advise what you conceive to be for the public good; leaving to parliament, in its superior wisdom, to adopt as much or as little of your advice as it shall see convenient. If this is all the part you mean to act, you do no more than what becomes you as a vigilant senator, whose zeal, in every event, merits the thanks of the public. But in this case, I would advise you, by  
*sic* way

way of consistency, to blot out from your Speech certain expressions, very significantly printed in Italics, and likewise to enter your solemn protest against certain Resolves of county meetings and committees; all of which strongly indicate some other mode of advising, some other form of prayer, of a more coercive and effectual kind.

I see in every part of your Speech much diligence, much information, and much arrangement; and it is, in this respect, both entertaining and instructive; but I perceive, at the same time, that it is the arrangement of a merchant or manufacturer, whose thoughts go no farther than to increase the neat profits of his trade, by lessening the expences of it. In such a man it would be certainly wise to get the usual work of two labourers to be performed by one, or the work of twenty to be performed by a machine; and from thence you conclude, that it would be equally wise in the British nation to get all the busines of the several State depart-  
ments

ments executed by five or six men, at the annual expence of a few hundred pounds. But, Sir, you are far behind in the art of simile-making, if you imagine there is any analogy between the supreme management of an independent State, and the managment of a brewhouse. And yet so you seem inclined ; for in all this long Speech, in which you even profess, along with saving money, an intention to correct many political abuses, there does not appear one political idea to direct or limit your oeconomy ; so that, for any thing you know, or consider, you may be doing the public a pound of damage, while you are saving it an ounce of money. Now, Sir, if I had leisure and inclination to write a Letter as long as your Speech, it would be easy for me to shew that the consideration of the public oeconomy of every nation is inseparably connected with that of its particular form of government : That in all States, where the use of money is known, one universal practice prevails ; which is that of raising a certain

a certain sum from the whole inhabitants, to be afterwards distributed to a few of them : That this distribution is not alone intended as the *means* of procuring certain services to be performed for the community, but is itself one of the ultimate ends for which the money is raised : That according to the different forms of government, the public money is differently distributed ; and that the numbers and quality of the receivers is that which chiefly marks the different Constitutions of different states, whether despotic, aristocratic, or popular ; whether military or ecclesiastic. In the course of this dissertation, it would be easy for me to shew that one form of government is naturally less expensive than another ; and I should probably finish it by shewing, that the cheapest is not always the most eligible. At present I shall content myself with observing, that no such leading political principle is to be found, either expressed or implied, in your Speech ; but on the contrary, if we may be allowed to

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judge by implication, there is ground to believe that you had no fixed political principle at all in your mind at the time you composed it. My ground for this bold assertion is, that I find in different parts of that Speech a recommendation of practices implying principles and views perfectly incompatible with one another. For in some parts it seems to be your drift to extend the popularity of our government; in other parts you praise a conduct borrowed from despotism, and which can only be expected from such a State. For instance, you recommend the frugal management of the King of Prussia's household, as a matter of imitation for the King of Great-Britain. We all know that the King of Prussia's cook is *under contract* to furnish dinner to his majesty, for twenty shillings a day, and to receive five shillings a-head for such guests as may be occasionally invited beyond that number. Now, Sir, I will venture to assert, upon the credit of those who have often stood behind our Sovereign, when at his meals, that he is neither a *glutton*

*and three  
other persons*

glutton nor an epicure; and that he may be fed as cheaply as the King of Prussia, whenever you and your friends will put him in a similar situation. But this frugality is impracticable while a Member of parliament insists upon having the honour of turning his spit; and who would immediately go over to the Minority, in case his Majesty should at any time find fault with his pocketing as much kitchen-fee in one day as would maintain the King of Prussia and his French *beaux esprits* for a month.

You exhibit, with great ostentation, the late Edict of the King of France, recalling many lucrative offices that had been granted to persons and families of great distinction; expressing at the same time his intention of employing that money in the defence of the State, or of occasionally distributing it to persons whom he should think most deserving. But you ought to consider, before you make such invidious comparisons, that a French King's edicts are equal in authority

with our Acts of parliament; and that none of these great people who are thus deprived of their appointments have any votes, by which they may thwart and perplex his future measures.

You commend the King of France for his judgment, and his regard for his people, in appointing one who is a Swiss and a Protestant to direct his finances. What are we to draw from hence? Would you think our King acted with judgment if he sent for a foreign Papist, let his knowledge of finances be what it would, and set him at the head of his treasury?

If you could only tell us what you would be at, an obscure friend like me might be perhaps able to help you in reducing it to effect, or in convincing you that it was impracticable. But, if after all this ambiguity, you are really willing to save the nation's money by giving our monarch, like the Kings of France and Prussia, an unlimitted power of withholding salaries from those who do nothing

nothing useful for them; although I most heartily abominate the project, yet to explain to you what I mean by the *spirit of business*, I will point out a method by which it may be easily accomplished. Nor, perhaps will the communication be altogether useless to the public. The knowledge of poisons is a necessary branch of the medicinal art, were it only for this, that they are carefully to be avoided, which would not happen, if those who have the administration of medicines were not taught accurately to distinguish those poisons from the salutary drugs.

With this useful view, and in perfect confidence that the good people of England will not be so mad, as wittingly and willingly to swallow arsenic, instead of sugar, after I have shewn them the difference, I will shew you how a King of England may be set as free from the necessity of corrupting or being corrupted, as any King on the Continent. Nor do I mean to arrogate any praise to myself for the discovery;

discovery ; for I confess that I received the first hint of it from a public letter of the Duke of RICHMOND ; though his grace, who is more a man of bustle than a man of business, did not probably see the whole merit of his innovation, nor to what a degree it might be improved.

Let there then be invitations printed in the newspapers for convening meetings in each county, addressed :

*To the copyholders, curates, and all the other inhabitants of the county of who have never been permitted to vote for Members of parliament : and when met, let some person, previously trained at the societies for public speaking, address them in a strain somewhat like the following :*

“ Friends and Countrymen,

“ You must have all observed that in  
“ the advertisement for the purpose of  
“ convening this meeting, the freehold-  
“ ers of the county have been studiously  
“ excluded ; but it is now proper to in-  
“ form you that this exclusion is not in-  
“ tended to be perpetual. God forbid

“ that

“ that in a plan which is meant to establish  
“ the equal liberty of every Englishman,  
“ the freeholders alone should be depriv-  
“ ed of their birthright. But as this plan  
“ strikes directly at what we apprehend  
“ to be an usurpation of theirs, it might  
“ have been productive of much disorder,  
“ if we had admitted them into our  
“ deliberations, till the plan came to be so  
“ settled, that their opposition to it would  
“ be manifestly ineffectual, and conse-  
“ quently not attempted. Indeed, if we  
“ were to interpret the name *Freeholders*,  
“ according to the conduct of those who  
“ have borne it, we must conclude that  
“ they were so called from their *holding*  
“ themselves alone to be *free*, while they  
“ *held* all the other inhabitants of the  
“ county to be slaves, and creatures of  
“ whose persons and property they had  
“ the intire disposal. It is, indeed, an  
“ usurpation of long standing, and if it  
“ had been used with moderation, and  
“ for the general good of the community,  
“ it might have lasted still longer,

“ without our being prompted to search  
“ into its original foundation. But  
“ lulled by our long patience into a state  
“ of security, they have, by little and  
“ little, turned this usurped power into a  
“ disgraceful and pernicious traffic, which  
“ has at last opened our eyes, and obliges  
“ us to abolish it, as oppressive to the  
“ majority of the individuals, and dan-  
“ gerous to the State itself. Our govern-  
“ ment has been said to be a government  
“ of King, Lords, and Commons; but it  
“ has been said unthinkingly and with-  
“ out examination. It will be found,  
“ that of late years, neither the King,  
“ the Lords, nor nine out of ten of the  
“ Commons, have had any essential share  
“ in it; but that the whole has been  
“ exercised by a few in the counties,  
“ who call themselves *Freeholders*, and  
“ a few in certain towns, who call  
“ themselves *Freemen*, under which names,  
“ which add insult to injury, they have  
“ given and granted the property of  
“ the rich and the poor, of the Peer  
“ and

“ and the Peasant without their advice or  
“ consent. And to whom did they give  
“ and grant our money ? It was said  
“ to the King ; to be expended in the  
“ public service, and in the defence of  
“ the kingdom. If this had been true,  
“ there would have been no solid ground  
“ for complaint ; but it is all a juggle.  
“ The King, upon a nearer inspection, is  
“ now found out to be only their steward  
“ or banker, and that they have employed  
“ the plenitude of their power, or influence,  
“ in demanding back from him by their  
“ agents or representatives in parliament  
“ a great part of this public money for  
“ their own private use ; and a much  
“ greater part than the public service,  
“ especially in time of war, could with  
“ safety permit.

“ I do not like to enter into a disgust-  
“ ful detail of what has been justly  
“ called a *System of Corruption*. Those  
“ who have any curiosity of this sort  
“ will find sufficient gratification to it

“ from reading the speeches of the  
“ Minority in parliament, as printed in  
“ every newspaper; and from Mr.  
“ BURKE’s excellent Speech, which for  
“ your benefit he has given to the press.  
“ It is sufficient for me to have hinted to  
“ you the general principle of this system,  
“ and the source from whence it pro-  
“ ceeds. The time is now come for  
“ putting an end to it. It is now time  
“ that our gracious Sovereign, our an-  
“ cient Nobility, and every free-born  
“ Englishman, should be freed from an  
“ unworthy thraldom to a set of contrac-  
“ tors, jobbers, and East India clerks;  
“ and that, instead of the dominion of  
“ money, the dominion of men should  
“ be once more restored. If you are  
“ hearty in this design, nothing can  
“ prevent the accomplishment of it. To  
“ bribe you will not be attempted; and  
“ you are too numerous to be forced.  
“ Nor is there any quarter from whence  
“ force is to be apprehended. The King  
“ must

“ must be pleased with our dutiful attachment, and the confidence we place in him: the Nobility seem to participate of our sufferings; and even many of the Freeholders shew themselves to be dissatisfied with the consequences of the system, as appears by the petitions and resolves of the late county meetings, though, by the bias'd Freeholders having been the majority at these meetings, there has been no attempt made at them for probing the sore to the bottom, and producing an effectual cure.

“ I therefore move, *That an humble address and petition be drawn up and presented to his Majesty, praying him to take under his royal and paternal care the expenditure of the public money: That he will be graciously pleased to abolish all sinecures and useless places; to retrench all exorbitant salaries; and to revoke or diminish all pensions which are held by persons who have never done any thing to deserve them. And, moreover, to assure*

*" his Majesty, that we, his faithful people,  
" will support him in the execution of this  
" his public duty, with our lives and for-  
" tunes, against every cabal of every denomi-  
" nation whatsoever."*

This, Sir, is a plausible sort of language, which has often been successful in destroying public liberty, and perhaps never bade fairer for success than in this country at this present time. I hope, however, that neither you, nor any of your associates in reformation, will suffer your rage against bad ministers to carry you such lengths as to try the experiment. Every form of government, like every other contrivance of that frail and imperfect creature, man, is subject to abuses, of one sort or another; and it is a sufficient encomium upon ours to say, that it is, in the opinion of the wisest men in Europe, that form by which abuses are best prevented. Whatever checks can be constitutionally given to faults in the administration of our government, it is our duty to give;

but let us be cautious in our amendments, how we touch that venerable Constitution itself, and let us constantly approach it with a fearful and trembling hand. *O&tingentorum annorum fortuna disciplinaque compages hæc coaluit : quæ convelli nisi cum exitio convellentium non potest. Sed vobis maximum discrimen, penes quos aurum & opes, præcipuæ bellorum causæ.* These lines of Tacitus I beg you to read to your friend the Marquis of ROCKINGHAM; and to tell him from me, his unknown well-wisher, that whatever advantage may accrue to the low, the profligate, and the needy, from the bonds of law and government being thrown loose, that a Peer of England, with a fortune suitable to his high rank, has nothing to hope from it, nor from any of those scenes of bloodshed and rapine, with which such dissolutions are generally attended.

These, Sir, unconnected with all party views, are my own genuine sentiments upon

upon the busines now in agitation ; and  
I hope you will believe me equally sin-  
cere, when I assure you, that

I am, with great personal regard,

Your friend and well-wisher,

STEADY.

LONDON, Mar. 13,  
1780.

F I N I S.

